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But first, a clarification…
 This presentation is not about outsourcing, which is difficult to 
define and measure
We focus on contracting behaviour and choice of supplier
 Can we detect patterns in supplier selection across UK 
councils that may be related to political control, UK 
region/nation, austerity or other local factors?
Procurement as a strategic political tool
 Longstanding call to make procurement more strategic and 
involve politicians more in supplier selection, service model 
design and contract management (Byatt 2001; Bolton 2006; 
Murray 2007)
 EU regulations do allow public bodies to take account of social 
and environmental issues in procurement decisions
 Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012, Public Contracts 
Regulations 2015, current UK government consultation all 
moving UK policy further in this direction
 More explicit calls by Scottish and Welsh governments to 
consider social impact of procurement
 Locally, the ‘Preston model’ has sparked interest
However:
 Most studies focus on:
 The barriers that SMEs and third sector organisations face in winning public 
contracts (Loader 2007; Peck and Cabras 2010; Ancarani 2019)
 The potential conflicts between regulatory compliance, price and public 
value (Erridge and McIlroy 2002)
 Sustainable procurement (Preuss, 2009; Thomas & Jackson, 2007)
 E-Procurement (Moon 2002)
 Transparency, rent-seeking and corruption in public contracting (Neu et al 
2015; Auriol et al 2016)
 Local authorities are more likely than other public bodies to buy from local 
suppliers/SMEs (Walker and Brammer 2009). But are political control,  central 
government frameworks and austerity also influential?
 How political/strategic are councils in their procurement choices?
Hypotheses
 Councils that are politically in the balance are more likely to 
agree contracts with local suppliers (assumption based on pork-
barrel principle)
 Councils in Scotland and Wales are more likely to agree contracts 
with local suppliers (assumption based on policy of devolved 
governments)
 Councils that have been less affected by austerity are more likely 
to agree contracts with local suppliers (assumption based on cost 
being less decisive in procurement decisions)
Method
 Since May 2015, all public bodies have been required to publish tender 
documents and contracts online (https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder)
 Tussell (www.tussell.com) harvest, repurpose and sell these data to contractors 
(and us!)
 107,000 lines of data – each a different contract agreed by an upper- or single-
tier authority in England, Scotland or Wales 
 NI excluded from the analysis 
 Data on length or value of contract often missing
 Still interesting to see the number of contracts each council signed with local 
suppliers and SMEs
 Mapped against variables of political control, austerity and UK region/nation
 Controlled for median earnings, job density and number of businesses in the 
local authority area
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N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean
Minimum MaximumLower Bound Upper Bound
London 32 17.0406 9.41372 1.66413 13.6466 20.4346 .00 40.01
County 27 29.0204 15.61298 3.00472 22.8441 35.1967 6.15 70.78
Metropolitan 36 30.6186 15.49943 2.58324 25.3744 35.8629 9.00 71.74
Unitary 55 33.2338 15.74946 2.12366 28.9761 37.4915 .00 76.19
Scotland 32 47.2834 16.80313 2.97040 41.2253 53.3416 5.26 76.65
Wales 22 49.9232 21.21341 4.52271 40.5177 59.3287 3.77 91.78
Total 204 33.6782 18.65042 1.30579 31.1036 36.2529 .00 91.78
Contract award to local suppliers by type 
of council
Coefficientsa
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 77.801 8.957 8.686 .000
Earnings -.078 .018 -.299 -4.224 .000
Job_Density .136 4.107 .002 .033 .974
Enterprise_Population
.000 .000 -.197 -2.836 .005
2 (Constant) 51.113 11.077 4.614 .000
Earnings -.031 .023 -.117 -1.323 .187
Job_Density -.188 3.944 -.003 -.048 .962
Enterprise_Population
.000 .000 -.187 -1.622 .106
LondonCouncils -10.786 4.409 -.211 -2.446 .015
CountyCouncils 4.495 6.130 .082 .733 .464
MetropolitanCouncils -3.036 3.407 -.062 -.891 .374
ScotlandCouncils 13.610 3.518 .266 3.869 .000
WalesCouncils 14.733 3.996 .246 3.687 .000
a. Dependent Variable: Contracts_Percent_Local
Summary of findings
 No correlations with preference for SMEs, plus some coding issues here 
anyway
 No correlations with spending power reductions in English councils
 Correlation between political control and preference for local suppliers 
disappears when controlling for region/nation
 Clear correlation between Scottish and Welsh councils and contracting 
with local suppliers
 London councils are negatively associated with % of contracts awarded 
to local suppliers
Concluding thoughts
 May be a link between Scottish and Welsh government policies and 
council contracting behaviour
 London councils may find it easier to attract suppliers from outside the 
postal code area
 Postal code areas differ in size; some councils will have more ‘local’ 
suppliers to choose from than others
 Next steps:
 Longitudinal analysis
 Examine political control and preference for public/private/third sector 
suppliers
 Examine suppliers and councils by region rather than postal code area
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